

CONFIDENTIAL

73-78/3

14 1073

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Classification of Documents in OER

1. In the course of the recent survey of OER we inquired into the classification of reports produced by the office. Analysts and supervisory personnel are conscious of the new provisions for classification, but OER management states that there is still a problem of ingrained habit that exercises an influence on practice.

2. Internal office notices formerly were classified for the most part at the level of Confidential. The use of symbols instead of spelling out organizational titles now permits issuance of many such notices at the unclassified level of Administrative-Internal Use Only. Use of the caveat "sensitive sources and methods" still appears on documents when its applicability strikes us as doubtful. No steps have been taken, or are planned, to review past issuances for purposes of downgrading.

3. We requested a review of classification of documents issued for the periods of 1 July through 31 December in both 1971 and 1972 to compare results before and after the new procedures took effect. This sample includes Intelligence Memoranda, Intelligence Reports, Handbooks, and Research Aids issued for those periods. It does not include the large volume of special papers produced by the office, nor its many contributions to other issuances of the community. While the figures indicate an increase in the proportion of lower classification, OER states that this also reflects a downgrading of some papers in order to permit wider dissemination. The results are tabulated as follows:

Total for 1971 period - 132			Total for 1972 period - 92		
Unc.	2	1.5%	5	5.4%	
Conf.	47	35.6%	53	57.7%	
Sec.	58	44.0%	27	29.4%	
Sec CW	11	8.3%	1	1.0%	
TS CW	4	3.0%	2	2.2%	
TK	9	6.8%	4	4.3%	
OUO	1	.8%	-	--	

CLASSIFIED BY 056735

IG/OER

FORWARD TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF E. O. 11652, AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED AT
TWO YEAR INTERVAL UNLESS INDICATED ON

CONFIDENTIAL

31 December 1979
(Insert date or event)

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4. As an outgrowth of this inquiry one question emerged that you may wish to consider in terms of how it may apply to the Agency in the future. In the event that there is a Congressional inquiry into the background and conduct of the war in Indochina, it is likely that the Agency would be requested to provide documentary material for those conducting the study. This could range all the way from requests for specific documents to entire collections of reports. Obviously, the considerations affecting declassification and release of material are manifold -- they range from clandestine reports that might reveal sensitive sources to DDI reports the sensitivity of which related primarily to the fact that the subject was under consideration at policy levels at the time the paper was prepared. In the event that such requests are made of the Agency it would be useful if advance consideration had already been given the problem, in order that a prompt and reasonable response could be made. In this connection, OER states that it would take three knowledgeable persons some four to six weeks to conduct a declassification review of the six safe drawers of reports on the Indochina War that it has for the period 1965-1972.

(Signed) William V. Broe

William V. Broe
Inspector General

25X1A

cc: SAIC [REDACTED]

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release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80B01086A000900050002-7
MEMORANDUM FOR: ER

A re-do of ER 73-781/2 (now dated 14 rather
than 12 Feb 73)..... para 2 text changed.

O/IG/cm
14 Feb 73

(DATE)

release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP80B01086A000900050002-7

GFD:bec (15 Feb 73)DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Deputy Director for Plans
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of National Estimates
DDI
DDI

SUBJECT: Development of Guidelines for Declassification

1. The conclusion of the conflict in Vietnam raises the possibility of a Congressional inquiry into the background and conduct of the Indo-Chinese war. Conceivably this Agency could be required to provide documentary material in support of such an inquiry. Such requests could range from specific documents to entire collections of finished intelligence reports. Obviously the considerations which would affect possible declassification in release of the material are myriad. Equally obviously, it is not worthwhile in terms of manpower allocations to anticipate such an inquiry at this time and initiate declassification review actions. Such a course could result in a considerable waste of manpower.
2. I believe that it is possible at this time to put our thinking caps on and develop within each concerned Directorate and Office preliminary guidelines for the potential declassification of documents

relative to the Indo-Chinese war. I would appreciate it if you would assign someone this task, advising me of the guidelines established for your area of interest upon completion of the effort.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED☐ INTERNAL
ONLY☒ CONFIDENTIAL☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Buckslip & attachment

FROM:

Inspector General

EXTENSION

6565

NO.

to 73-781/3

DATE

14 FEB 1973 IG Survey/DER

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. *h*
Executive Director-
Comptroller*2/14 2/24**[Signature]*

2.

3.

SAIC

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14.

15.

*I'd think you +
I might be
able to consider
the contingencies
and any necessary
preparation without
shutting all the
offices - what
think? —
[Signature]*